


# Managing Frequency

An overview of the RIS technical appendix B

# Watch the whole series



# Presenters

Andrew Paver



RIS stream lead  
Future Energy Systems  
AEMO

Jane Yu




RIS team member  
Future Energy Systems  
AEMO

# Today's Webinar



Key concepts



Approach



Core areas of analysis




Going forward



# Key Concepts


# Frequency

Frequency is the **heartbeat of the power system** that ensures everything is in sync. It tells us information about the electricity supply and demand balance in real time.




# Frequency disturbances

- If electricity demand suddenly exceeds supply, power system frequency will decrease; and vice versa
- Frequency can change too quickly or go outside the designed boundaries under sudden loss of supply or demand on the system. Without frequency control, **equipment or devices can be damaged or trip off**



# Frequency control







# Approach


# Study objectives

Under the projected system conditions out to 2025:

What is required to manage frequency for **credible events**?



What are the **inertia requirements** (for system intact)?



What are the changes to the **risk profile of non-credible events**?

# Changes to frequency control


## Since the introduction of FCAS markets:

- Increased credible risk size
- Decreasing inertia
- Decreasing load relief
- Changing reserve dynamics
- Secondary risks
- Changing nature of **Non-credible events**

# Changing System - Decreasing Inertia

- **Online inertia will reduce** as more synchronous generation is displaced by wind and solar **increasing potential RoCoF.**

Mainland NEM Inertia duration curves 2015-19 actuals vs 2025 forecasts





# Core areas of analysis

# Changes to frequency control

## Since the introduction of FCAS markets:

- Increased credible risk size
- Decreasing inertia
- Decreasing load relief
- Changing reserve dynamics
- Secondary risks
- Changing nature of **Non-credible risks**


Impact on Frequency sensitive  
reserve requirements for  
**Credible events**

Power system model


# Power system model

## Simulation Parameters

- Inertia [MWs]
- Load Relief [pu/pu]
- Reserve [MW]
  - Base reserve model[MW]
  - Faster reserve [%]
- Size of Risk [MW]
  - Primary Risk [MW]
  - Secondary Risks [MW]




## Single Bus Model



# Frequency trace assessment

Load= 18860MW, Inertia= 100GWs, Risk= 750MW, Load relief= 1.5




- To arrest frequency, replacement power needs to **fully replace the lost active power**.
- When frequency is arrested depends on the speed of response
- With the same speed, **more frequency sensitive reserve is required**.



# Decreasing inertia

Study parameters

Credible Risk = 750 MW, Low Load = 18860 MW, Load Relief = 0.5



Each point represents how much frequency sensitive reserve is required to meet the frequency containment requirements

The 6 second reserve requirement is the amount of frequency sensitive reserve, at a speed equivalent to 6 second FCAS


Pre-contingent Inertia [MWs]

—●— Basecase    ■ Historic Inertia Range

The Inertia on the system before we trip the risk


# Changing reserve dynamics

- **Faster reserve:** programmable to respond in 100s of milliseconds
- **Switched reserve:** typically interruptible **loads with switching controllers**



# Secondary risks

- **Secondary risk:** the trip or reduction of generation that may occur alongside the trip of a large generator
- For the same amount of reserve, secondary risks can exacerbate underfrequency events



# Managing Credible Risks



Volume of required **frequency sensitive reserve** needed increases under lower inertia



Introduction of **faster reserve** can help but **where and how it is provided** needs to be considered




A **minimum amount of dynamic response** is required on the system



How we manage **Secondary risks such as DPV** needs to be considered

# Non-credible risks

- **Non-credible events:**
  - More onerous than credible events
  - Trip of multiple generation units OR
  - Trip of double transmission lines
- **Managed using a combination of:**
  - Primary frequency response
  - Emergency frequency control schemes e.g. UFLS



# Changing non-credible risks

## Rate of change of frequency



- Reduced inertia and load relief
- Loss of generation on RoCoF protection

## Increasing Complexity



- Loss of DPV during an event
- DPV behaviour, IBR behaviour, and intertrip schemes
- DPV penetration into UFLS

## Separation



- Non-credible separation can island a part of the network

# Managing non-credible risks



**1** Mandatory PFR Rule Change



**2** Impact of DPV on UFLS



**3** Quantify RoCoF limits



**4** Investigate regional contingency FCAS requirements



# Going forward



# Managing the transition




System characteristics will continue to shift into **new operating territory**



Revision of **ancillary service arrangements**



A minimum level of **synchronous inertia** is needed out to 2025



Improved knowledge and **tools** are enablers for progressing to lower inertia



A **staged approach** to operating at lower inertia is recommended




# Actions going forward

AEMO to publish a detailed **frequency control workplan** in 2020 covering:

- Revising ancillary service arrangements to match future operating conditions
- Investigating the introduction of a system inertia safety net for the mainland NEM
- Defining System RoCoF limits
- Continued investigation into DPV penetration into UFLS load blocks
- Applying appropriate limits to the total proportion of switched FCAS
- Investigating appropriate regional contingency FCAS requirements
- Improving AEMO's existing system frequency model



# Actions to support changing power system



- By 2025 the instantaneous penetration of wind and solar will **exceed 50%**
- The RIS provides an **action plan to securely meet penetrations up to and beyond 75%**
- If **action is not taken, wind and solar may be limited to 50-60%** of total generation
- No insurmountable reasons why the NEM cannot operate securely at even higher levels of instantaneous wind and solar penetration in future

# Watch the rest of the series



